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CHAPTER 10 
Conflict of Laws 
MONROE INKER 
§IO.l. Governmental interests in workmen's compensation: Full 
faith and credit. Lavoie's Case l is a significant case, not only locally 
but nationally, in the field of conflict of laws and workmen's com-
pensation. 
Lucien Lavoie suffered injuries on his job in Massachusetts. He 
was a Rhode Island resident, his employer was a Rhode Island corpora-
tion, and the employment contract had been entered into in Rhode 
Island. In a suit brought by the employee, a Rhode Island court 
awarded him compensation under its Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Thereafter, Lavoie sought compensation for the same injury in 
Massachusetts under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Massa-
chusetts. Lavoie did not seek double compensation. He conceded that 
any sums received under the Rhode Island award should be credited 
to any Massachusetts award. A single member of the Massachusetts 
board, and the reviewing board affirming his decision, held that the 
board had no jurisdiction to award compensation since the contract 
of hire was entered into in Rhode Island. The Superior Court en-
tered a decree reciting that the Massachusetts board lacked jurisdiction 
to award additional compensation and that an award was barred by 
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case to the 
board, holding that (1) An employee, as here, who suffers injury in 
this Commonwealth arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment while performing work under a contract of hire made in another 
state where he was principally employed, can recover under the Massa-
chusetts act. (2) The Rhode Island award did not, under the full 
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, bar an 
award under the Massachusetts act. 
It is well settled today that the state of injury may without violating 
the due process clause of the United States Constitution apply its own 
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workmen's compensation act even though the contract of hire was 
made in another state.2 In Pacific Employer's Insurance Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission3 the Supreme Court, in upholding an 
application of the California Workmen's Compensation Act to a Cali-
fornia injury, said, "Few matters could be deemed more appropriately 
the concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more completely 
within its power." 4 However, the Supreme Court has also held in 
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick 5 that the application of a Texas statute 
to a foreign contract where the only interest of Texas was qua forum 
was a violation of the due process clause. 
In deciding that the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act 
could be applied in the Lavoie case, the Court had first to answer a 
question of internal Massachusetts law, that is, whether the terms of 
the act would permit recovery of an award where the injured employee 
was hired under a Rhode Island contract. The act does not explicitly 
deal with this situation and the question had never before been 
presented to the Supreme Judicial Court. However, in Bagnel v. 
Springfield,6 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided as 
did the Supreme Judicial Court in the present case that the Massa-
chusetts Workmen's Compensation Act could be applied where an 
injury occurred in Massachusetts under a foreign contract of hire. 
Although the Court cited dictum from Gould's Case,7 as precedent, 
the decision in Lavoie's Case is predicated upon a recognition of what 
has been called the "governmental interest" 8 of Massachusetts in 
applying its Workmen's Compensation Act.9 
When an employee is injured here, Massachusetts has a substantial 
interest in the transaction, since the burden of his care and support 
is most likely to fall upon private persons and public agencies 
operating here. 
Moreover, many times an injured employee, if he is to maintain suit 
in the state of injury under a foreign act, as distinct from the act 
of the state of injury, will be left without a remedy. Most workmen's 
2 See Langschmidt, Choice of Law in Workmen's Compensation, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 
322, 328-349 (1956). 
3306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939). The full faith and credit 
clause was the only question raised in the Pacific Employers Insurance Co. case, 
but the Court approved the application of the California act as within the due 
process clause. The same issue was involved in a recent case: "Arkansas therefore 
has a legitimate interest in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though 
in this case Carroll's injury may have cast no burden on her or on her institutions." 
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413, 75 Sup. Ct. 804, 807, 99 L. Ed. 1183, 1189 (1955). 
4306 U.S. at 503, 59 Sup. Ct. at 633, 83 L. Ed. at 945. 
5281 U.S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926 (1930). 
6144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944). 
7215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913). 
8 Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 
Sup. Ct. 518, 524, 79 L. Ed. 1044, 1052 (1935). 
9 The instant case is probably the weakest kind of case to reflect the governmental 
interests of Massachusetts. Lavoie's only connection with this state was that he 
was working here on a temporary basis. He was removed to Rhode Island im-
mediately after his injury. 
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compensation acts provide for a special administrative remedy, and 
enforcement in a foreign state is often impossible.10 
The Court's second holding, that the Rhode Island award did not, 
under the full faith and credit clause, constitute a bar to an award 
of compensation in Massachusetts, is in accord with the principles set 
down by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. HuntY Hunt, domiciled in Louisiana, 
was hired in that state by the Magnolia Petroleum Company and, in 
the scope of his employment, was injured in Texas. He received 
compensation pursuant to the Texas workmen's compensation laws 
under an award which in due time became final. Thereafter he sued 
in Louisiana to recover compensation under the Louisiana compensa-
tion laws statute, and the defendant pleaded the Texas award as res 
judicata. The Louisiana court gave payment for Hunt with proper 
deductions for the Texas payments, but on certiorari the Supreme 
Court, with Chief Justice Stone speaking for the majority, reversed 
this determination as a violation of full faith and credit. The Court 
held that if recovery were allowed under one state's workmen's com-
pensation act, the res judicata effect of the judgment had to be accepted 
by all sister states. Four years later in Industrial Commission v. Mc-
Cartin12 the United States Supreme Court severely cut down the scope 
of the decision in the Magnolia case. 
In McCartin the employee initiated compensation proceedings be-
fore the proper agencies in both Wisconsin, the state of injury, and 
Illinois, the state of the employment contract. Pending the adjudica-
tion of the Wisconsin claim, the Illinois Commission entered an 
award based upon a settlement contract, which provided that the 
settlement was not to affect any rights of the employee under Wis-
consin law, and this award was paid. The Wisconsin proceedings 
in McCartin, unlike those in Hunt, did not involve a court-instituted 
suit against the employer; and the reservation in the Illinois award 
could be regarded only as a disclaimer of any intent on the part of 
Illinois that its "exclusive remedy" clause should be operative beyond 
its own borders. Acting under the supposed strength of the decision in 
Hunt, however, the Wisconsin court reversed its Commission's award 
in favor of the employee, under which the carrier had been credited 
with the sum awarded and paid under the Illinois award. This action 
was reversed by the decision of the Supreme Court which held that 
Hunt was distinguishable and, therefore, not controlling. 
An able commentator has said of the McCartin case: "McCartin 
did not expressly overrule Hunt; but it so severely limited Hunt as 
to give rise to the inference that it had no continued vitality apart 
from the exact case then before the Court." 13 
10 See Note, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 744 (1953). 
11320 U.S. 430, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149 (1943). 
12330 U.S. 662, 67 Sup. Ct. 886, 91 L. Ed. 1140 (1947). 
13 Clark, Work-Injuries and the Constitution: Carroll v. Lanza, 5 Wash. U.L.Q. 
320, 330 (1956). 
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Whatever vitality was left in Hunt has been greatly lessened by 
the recent case of Carroll v. Lanza,14 in which the Supreme Court 
rejected a claim that Arkansas had to give full faith and credit to a 
Missouri workmen's compensation award granted under a statute 
which purported to grant an exclusive remedy. 
Neither the Rhode Island workmen's compensation law Hi nor the 
cases thereunder purport to make an award of the Rhode Island 
compensation board exclusive and final, and therefore the Massa-
chusetts Court in relying on the McCartin case was correct in finding 
that the Rhode Island award was not a bar to an award here. 
An important effect of Lavoie's Case will be to align Massachusetts 
with those states which characterize problems involving conflict of 
laws in workmen's compensation cases as problems in the category of 
employer-employee status.16 Thus Massachusetts has, through the 
years, characterized such problems first as tort problemsp then as 
contract problems,18 and now as employer-employee status problems. 
One further comment regarding the decision in Lavoie's Case should 
be made. "Allowing any forum having a minimum of formal contact 
with the injured employee to apply its own remedy would seem help-
ful in increasing certainty in an area of the law in which simplicity 
and stability are important considerations." 19 
§lO.2. Status of "recognized" children and their right to inherit. 
In Lopes v. Downeyl the intestate died domiciled in Massachusetts 
leaving no widow, issue, father, or mother. The five petitioners who 
claimed decedent's estate as next of kin and heirs were all children 
of a common father with the intestate but of different mothers. The 
petitioners and the decedent were properly acknowledged by the 
father in his lifetime on the birth records in the Public Registry of 
the Cape Verde Islands in accordance with Portuguese law, the govern-
ing law of the Cape Verde Islands. The estate in question consisted 
solely of an account in a Massachusetts bank which the claimants 
would be entitled to inherit under the law of the Cape Verde Islands 
where all were born. 
Status is generally determined by the law of the domicile of the 
parties involved. Stumberg, in discussing the meaning of the word 
"status," says: 
There are a number of legal, domestic or family relations which 
are frequently designated under the general title "status." It is 
impossible to give an entirely satisfactory definition of the term, 
but in the Restatement, in which an entire chapter is devoted to 
14 349 U.S. 408, 75 Sup. Ct. 804, 99 L. Ed. 1183 (1955). 
15 R.I., G.L., c. 300 (1938). 
16 Langschmidt, Choice of Law in Workmen's Compensation, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 
322, 326 (1956). 
17 Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913). 
18 Wright's Case, 291 Mass. 334, 197 N.E. 5 (1935). 
19 The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 137 (1955). 
§1O.2. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 134 N.E.2d 131. 
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status, it is described as a legal personal relationship, not tem-
porary in its nature nor terminated at the mere will of the parties 
with which third persons and the state are concerned. The more 
important relationships which it includes are marriage, the status 
of parent and child, adoptions, custody and guardianship of the 
person.2 
The extent to which the domiciliary status will be given effect as 
regards the right to inherit depends upon the law which governs the 
distribution of the decedent's property.s The distribution of realty is 
governed by the law of the situs;4 personalty, by the law of the dece-
dent's domicile.5 Thus in the Lopes case, the law of the Cape Verde 
Islands would determine the status of the parties, but the law of Massa-
chusetts would determine the effects of that status on the right to in-
herit, since only personalty was involved. 
Petitioners conceded6 that the status of the decedent and themselves 
was that of illegitimate children of a common father. This clearly 
brought the facts within G.L., c. 190, §6, which provides: "If an 
illegitimate child dies intestate and without issue who may lawfully 
inherit his estate, such estate shall descend to his mother, or, if she 
is not living, to persons who would have been entitled thereto by 
inheritance through his mother if he had been a legitimate child." 7 
The petitioners were not related to the decedent's mother and the 
Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the petition. 
While the Court was not bound to go behind the concession of 
illegitimacy, there is a real question raised as to status after a civil 
law recognition of this kind. Petitioners argued that since their 
status under the foreign law gave them the right to inherit, Massa-
chusetts should recognize that right. But the authorities are uniform 
that while the personal law of a child's domicile may give him a status 
which will be given comity elsewhere, the right to inherit incidental 
to this status has no extraterritorial effect.s 
Here, however, the status of the claimant is that of a recognized 
child. This status, created by the civil law, is distinct from the status 
of legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated.9 It does not reach the 
status of legitimated where both laws would require the intermarriage 
of the parents, but it gives the "recognized" child the right to use the 
family name, to be supported by them, to inherit from their ascendents 
2 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 280 (2d ed. 1951). 
8 Harding v. Townsend, 280 Mass. 256, 182 N.E. 369 (1932); Ross v. Ross, 129 
Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321 (1880). 
4 Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186,20 Sup. Ct. 873, 44 L. Ed. 1028 (1900). 
5 Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830 (1916). 
61956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 601, 134 N.E. 2d 131, 132. 
7 First construed in Parkman v. McCarthy, 149 Mass. 502, 21 N.E. 760 (1889). 
S Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 73 A.L.R. 932 (10th Cir. 1930), noted in 73 A.L.R. 
941 (1931), 16 A.L.R.2d 626 (1951); Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321 
(1880). 
I) The Roman law treated the status of "recognized" children as legitimated. 
Brightley's notes, 5 Wheat. 262, 266, 7 C.J. 94 (U.S. 1820). 
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subject to one qualifIcation and from their brothers and sisters, and 
they are subject to paternal control and guardianship in the same 
manner as legitimate children. lO On the other hand, illegitimates who 
are not recognized have the right to support only where paternity is 
judicially proved and in all else are legally and entirely foreign to 
their parents and the parents' families.u 
Since the law which determines the status has not denominated it 
as illegitimate but has treated it as sui generis, should not the lex situs 
assign to that foreign-created status a classification most closely 
analogous to one created by its own law? 12 The Portuguese Code 
consistently refers to the status of a recognized child as one of adop-
tion and the parallels between the two are evident.13 A Massachusetts 
case has held that a natural parent may adopt her own child 14 and 
that a foreign adoption law may differ considerably from the local law 
and still the status will be given effect here.15 Granted that once the 
status is classified the lex situs will apply its own law in determining 
the effects of that status on the right to inherit, the proposition here 
is that the rights and incidents which the foreign law has attached to 
that status should be considered in classifying it.16 
Under G.L., c. 210, §7, an adopted child may inherit from other 
adopted children of the same parent. Thus in the Lopes case, while 
petitioners attempted to raise the issue in their brief, the Court was 
able to avoid it in light of their concession and the applicable statute. 
Although the result may be difficult to disagree with on this ground, 
a substantial question was raised and left open.17 
§lO.3. Recognition of foreign ex parte divorce. Under the doc-
trine of Sherrer v. Sherrer1 and Johnson v. Muelberger,2 a divorce 
predicated on a hearing in which both parties have appeared, whether 
10 The relevant portions of the Portuguese Civil Code are Article 119, and, as set 
forth in the Supplement to Petitioner's Brief, Articles 129 (1st), (2d), (3d), 2000, 
166, 275, in that order. The qualification on inheritance is that the "legitima" 
of adopted children is one third less than that of legitimate children, Art. 1785, 
where there are legitimate children, and further they may inherit from brothers 
and sisters where there are no legitimate brothers and sisters, Arts. 2000, 2002. 
11 Id., Art. 135. 
12 See the dissenting opinion of McDermott, J., in Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 
467 (10th Cir. 1930): "If the law confers upon a recognized illegitimate all the 
rights of legitimacy it can be properly said to have the 'status' of a legitimate child." 
13 G.L., c. 210. 
14 Petition of Curran, 314 Mass. 91, 49 N.E.2d 432 (1943). 
15 Ross v. Ross, 123 Mass. 212 (1877). 
16 See the opinion of Hand, J., in Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930), where the question was whether the French 
statute of limitations was procedural or substantive, and the Court went behind a 
statement of the French Code that the right was "extinguished" and looked at the 
effects of the statute and was able to classify it as merely procedural. 
17 In Rodrigues v. Rodrigues, 286 Mass. 77, 190 N.E. 20 (1934), the Portuguese Code 
was in issue, but the case is distinguishable in that a decree of a Portuguese court 
had "labeled" the child in question illegitimate. 
§1O.3. 1334 U.S. 343, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087, 92 L. Ed. 1429 (1948). 
2340 U.S. 581, 7I Sup. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 (1951). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/14
90 1956 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §10.3 
appearance is in person or by attorney, is entitled to full faith and 
credit. The question of jurisdiction may not be reopened in a foreign 
court. However, when the divorce proceeding is ex parte, the forum 
in which the validity of a foreign divorce is questioned may re-examine 
the jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce.3 This means that 
the issue of domicile may be reopened.4 
The Supreme Court of the United States has never made clear 
what criteria the re-examining court must apply in resolving this 
question of domicile nor has it indicated what weight must be given 
by the re-examining court to the finding of domicile by the court 
granting the divorce. 
The Massachusetts Court appears to treat the finding of domicile 
by the foreign court as of no relevance and disposes of the issue solely 
on the facts found by it. The case of Witzgall v. Witzgall,5 decided 
during the 1956 SURVEY year, typifies this approach. This case was a 
petition brought by Edna against her husband Roland and his alleged 
second wife, Marie, for a binding declaration as to the marital status 
of petitioner and Roland. From a decree that petitioner and Roland 
were still husband and wife, Roland appealed. The full bench 
affirmed the decree of the Probate Court. 
The facts were these: Edna and Roland were married and lived 
together in Lawrence until May, 1952, when Roland left her. He went 
to Florida in June, 1953, and made periodic trips between there and 
Lawrence. Suit for divorce was filed in Florida in November, 1953, 
Roland alleging that he was then, and had been for more than "ninety 
(90) days last past and prior to the filing" of the bill, a resident of Flor-
ida. Service of process on Edna was by registered mail but she did not 
appear, either personally or by an attorney. Roland's periodic visits 
to Lawrence continued through the time that the hearing on the bill 
was held in January, 1954. Roland returned to Lawrence early in 
February, prior to the rendition of the decree on February 27. In 
March, he and Marie went through a ceremony of marriage in New 
Hampshire, remaining there until they went to Florida in August. 
The probate judge had found on all the evidence that Roland did 
not have a domicile in Florida either at the time the bill was filed in 
November or when hearing was held thereon in January. Apart from 
the periodic nature of the trips between Florida and Massachusetts, 
these further factors were found: While in Florida, Roland occupied 
a single room there with a family in Jacksonville. He also did not 
divest himself of ownership or operation of a business in Lawrence 
until June, 1954; this latter finding was evidenced by his forwarding 
from Florida each week checks for the payroll of his employees. 
In the matter of foreign ex parte divorce proceedings, at least in 
3 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 68 Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945). 
4 "Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce- jurisdiction, 
strictly speaking - is founded on domicil." 325 U.S. at 229, 65 Sup. Ct. at 1095, 
89 L. Ed. at 1581. 
I) 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 875, 136 N.E.2d 219. 
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situations such as Witzgall v. Witzgall where the divorce affects a 
relationship deemed by our Court to be a Massachusetts res, the 
Supreme Judicial Court apparently feels that the motive in going 
to another jurisdiction to obtain an ex parte divorce concludes the 
issue of intent adversely to the Massachusetts resident.6 To our Court 
such individuals are deserters, no more, no less. 
This emphasis upon motive as determinative of intent appears to be 
peculiar to cases within the narrow limits of the situation disclosed 
by Witzgall v. Witzgall.7 
There is no question that a court in any case which involves intent 
has a great deal of latitude and in the Witzgall case the facts found 
by the Probate Court offer strong support to a finding that Witzgall 
never intended to establish his domicile in Florida. However, the 
almost automatic equation of purpose and intent in domicile questions 
involving foreign and ex parte divorces puts a well-nigh insuperable 
burden on the party seeking to sustain the foreign decree. 
Although many legal scholars have argued that domicile is not a 
unitary concept, the Supreme Judicial Court has never explicitly 
accepted this theory. It may be that opinions such as that of the 
Witzgall case are indicative of a tacit acceptance under the stress of 
concern for the plight of deserted wives.s In this jurisdiction a valid 
foreign divorce terminates a Massachusetts order for support 9 and 
there is no statute here providing for alimony to the wife after such 
a valid foreign divorce has been granted to the husband.1° 
6 See Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 324 Mass. 340, 84 N.E.2d 454 (1950). The standard 
test of domicile has been set forth in Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 60 (3d ed. 1949), 
as follows: 
"For an individual to acquire a domicile chosen by himself the authorities agree 
that two things are necessary: 
"I. Physical presence in the place where domicile is alleged to have been acquired. 
"2. Intent to make that place the home of the party." 
7 See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 58 L. Ed. 758 (1914). 
In Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 67 (3d ed. 1949), the author says: "The motive or 
reason prompting a person to make his home in a given place does not affect his 
acquisition of a domicile there." 
S Compare the resolution of the domicile question in Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 
388, 91 N.E. 394 (1910), with that in the Witzgall case. 
9 Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5 N .E.2d 417 (1936). 
10 See N.Y. Civil Practice Act §1l70·b, which reads as follows: "Maintenance of 
the wife where divorce or annulment previously granted on non-personal jurisdic-
tion. In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, or for a declaration of 
nullity of a void marriage, where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason 
of a finding by the court that a divorce, annulment, or judgment declaring the 
marriage a nullity had previously been granted to the husband in an action in 
which jurisdiction over the person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, 
nevertheless, render in the same action such judgment as justice may require for 
the maintenance of the wife." And see Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 
153 N.Y.S.2d (1955). 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/14
